On April 10, 2010, a Tu-154 aircraft crashed down in the Russian province of Smolensk. All 96 people on board were killed. This was, however, no ordinary flight, as the president of Poland, Lech Kacznyski was making his way to the site of the Katyń massacre (Asian News Monitor, 2010). The plane crash shattered all previous attempts of Poland and Russia to effectively repair their historically strained relations. These new moments, however, bring with them a dark grey gloom which hangs its head over the continent of Europe. The horizon brims with avoidable conflict as these two nations are again forced to opposite fields as competitors and rivals by a newly inflamed Ukraine. Russia and Poland are two nations with a brilliantly entangled history whose outcomes have shaped the face of Europe. Often as it does, the past shapes the future and the past has dangerously haunted these two nations for centuries. The bitterness between Russia and Poland is a central component to today’s divide between the former Soviet Union and the West. Only rapprochement between the two countries can bridge the gap between the West and the East that is so necessary for a peaceful world. Of the two nations, Poland is the primary inhibitor of warm relations. The dominating attitudes of the Poles must change for the West to avoid a geopolitical deluge of unprecedented repercussions.
In order to understand the true gravity of this geopolitical conundrum, one must trace the origins of this bitterness. Relations between Poland and Russia were not always hostile. For instance, while minor territorial squabbles were frequent, the first major confrontation between Poland and Russia occurred in 1604 when a claimant of the Muscovite (Russian) throne, Grishka Otrepiev led a Polish-sponsored invasion of Muscovy (Russia) (Zamoyski, 2012, p. 121). His armies swept through Moscovy with ease, as Muscovy was buried in unfortunate disasters which included plagues and famines (Sixsmith, 2014, p. 53-54). The previously downtrodden Russian society united and, in a miraculous way, forced the Poles out of Russia (p. 55). The Russian attitude toward Poland shifted significantly, as today there is a national holiday in Russia called Unity Day, which celebrates this triumph over the Poles. Polish attitudes, like those of the Russians, were forged from fury and the desire for freedom. In the words of Martin Sixsmith, “By the end of Catherine’s reign, Poland had ceased to exist as a physical entity, surviving only in the hearts of her people and their burning determination to see their country reborn” (p. 89). Russia, along with Austria and Prussia, had annihilated Poland (Zamoyski, 195). Russian intervention and occupation played a large part, but, ultimately, it was Prussia which crippled Poland the most (194-195). Polish attitudes would be further cemented by the countless crimes of the Soviet Union against its people, its religion, and its society. There are, simply, too many atrocities to analyze, but it must be understood that all nations within the Soviet sphere suffered immensely, Russia included.
Moreover, to properly understand all of the dynamics at play here, one must examine the views of each nation regarding the other. To begin with, Russia’s attitudes toward Poland have shifted drastically in the past decades. In the Soviet era, Russian views flipped between one of ‘the ungrateful Poles’ and one depicting the Poles as comrades (Cheremushkin, 2004, p. 12). As time went by, more and more Russians began to view the Poles unfavorably. The biggest reason was the Polish attitude of resistance. The Soviet Union had spared no effort in rebuilding Poland, but to many Poles, this was not enough. As the Soviet Union dissolved, this attitude became outdated. Now, a new attitude has arisen that revolves around Poland’s unceasing hostility toward Russia. At the end of the Cold War, Russians believed that NATO would not expand any further (Mearsheinmer, 2014). Russian concerns were ignored as NATO stretched eastward. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s former prime minister and current president, still expresses his amazement at the Cold-War attitudes expressed by the leaders who expanded NATO (Putin, 2015). Eventually, Poland joined NATO. Since then, the Poles have adopted unapologetically anti-Russian views (Sakwa, 2014, p.40). On top of this, the foreign minister of Poland, Radosław Sikorski came up with an initiative targeting former Soviet states with EU-integration (p. 39-41). This was very much viewed as a hostile expansion because of EU-integration historically acting as a precursor to NATO membership (Mearsheinmer). Later, the 2008 war in Georgia prompted Sikorski to lobby for rushing Ukraine into the arms of the West (Sakwa, p. 40). Vladimir Putin, himself, spoke against the idea then, and he still retains that view now (C. Rose & V. Putin, 2015). Putin has said that the Ukraine is important to Russia because of shared culture. In addition, he made it clear that he believes that the West was directly involved in brokering a transfer of power in Ukraine. Poland has actively supported Ukraine in the midst of this crisis, the new pro-West Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, has said (Interfax Russia and CIS Bulletin, 2015). Poland has even aided Ukrainian officials in drafting its decentralization bill, which was a product of the Minsk talks. As if Poland’s dissent toward Russia was not obvious enough, former Polish President, Bronisław Komorowski kindly provided more evidence. Before leaving office, he said that “Poland supports European aspirations of Ukraine.” These policies have placed Poland in the position of the boy who cried wolf. The Russian attitude has responded accordingly.
Incredibly, this attitude has not hampered the Russian government in seeking to make peace with Poland. Feklyunina describes the process of rapprochement as having three steps (2012, p. 436). The first is addressing current animosity. The second involves the political elite working to re-articulate national narratives to depict the other party as friendly. Lastly, the third step involves total peace between the two parties. Cheremushkin adds that one nation must accept that it has committed crimes against the other (p. 5). Russia’s efforts toward reconciliation began in the early 2000’s, as relations were steadily warming up. These efforts were hindered because of Polish insistence that reparations were needed (p. 8). Nevertheless, Russia continued to try. Cheremushkin argues that these attempts were hampered by the way that Russian officials handled the Katyń Massacre (p. 9). According to him, the Russian representatives declared that the Russian people suffered more from Stalin’s crimes than any other group. Despite the factual accuracy of such statements, they did not help Russia’s relationship with the Poles. The aim was for Russia to paint itself as a victim along with Poland. The result, however, was that focus was taken away from the Poles who died. Needless to say, the effort was not effective. The next attempt came when Putin made a monumental trip to Poland in 2002 (p. 10). He honored the victims and heroes of the Warsaw Uprising in addition to victims of Soviet crimes. He was well received by the Poles, but relations were still not as good as Moscow wanted them to be. In the 2007-2008 period, Russia revamped its Poland project (Feklyunina, p. 434). The Georgian conflict had broken out and the Poles were openly against the Russian measures that were taken (Sakwa, p.40). Russian policy-makers, not wanting to lose their precious progress with the Poles, revealed their willingness to discuss the issues of the past (Feklyunina, p. 434). A few years later, momentous steps were being taken by Russian policy-makers. 2010 was the first year that the Russian Prime Minister had attended a ceremony commemorating the Katyń massacre (p. 441). At this time, the Russian government was taking major efforts to promote the Russian language and culture in Poland. Ceaseless Russian efforts were gaining traction until April 10, 2010 when the plane carrying the Polish president crashed near Smolensk. Almost immediately after the accident, Russian officials passed their condolences on to the Poles. In a move that could be considered damage control, the Russian Duma (Parliament) officially recognized Stalin as the perpetrator of the Katyń massacre in an incredibly important resolution. Additionally, Andrzej Wajda’s historically accurate drama Katyń was shown on Russian State Television. Despite all of these crucial steps taken by the Russians, they were not enough. Relations quickly declined once both sides began to blame each other for the crash. Russia put forth so much effort in reconciling their differences with the Poles, and if Poland had reciprocated even half of that effort, the rapprochement could easily have already taken place.
On the other side of the spectrum, Polish concerns cannot be left out of the equation. For rapprochement to actually take place, there are complicated issues that must be worked through with regard to Poland’s national identity. Attitudes toward Russia are largely based in the context of Poland’s national identity (Zarycki, 2004, p. 611). This attitude can be traced from the time of the partitions of Poland, through the Soviet era, and into modern times (p. 604). The Poles saw Russian developments in their country as useless and unwanted throughout the 19th century. Later, in the Soviet period, attitudes came into conflict as the Left looked to Russia with a practical desire for cooperation (p. 598). The Right, alternatively, saw Russia as an occupier and resisted their influence at every turn. As time went on, the latter view became more and more popular. Now, pro-Russian views are mostly kept in the context of a Poland outside the European Union. These views, like those of their left-wing predecessors, are held in a practical desire for cooperation. There is no room for these viewpoints for the admiration of Russia. These views, themselves, will not shift because any Kremlin official desires it. Feklyunina rightly points out that the last stage of rapprochement occurs fully when the historical narratives of two nations converge to the point of being fully compatible (p. 437). Russia has made the attempt to bridge the gap (p. 444).The Russian narrative tries to create a national solidarity between nations by recounting a narrative of shared suffering. This, unfortunately, failed, but not for a lack of trying. There has been no Polish attempt to do the same for the Russians.
For Poland, altering the historical narrative to accommodate Russia means revamping the Polish national identity as a whole. This national identity is mired with complex interactions between glorious heroism and the horrors of subjugation (Zarycki, p.601-602). In addition, Polish society suffers from defeatism, an imperial complex, and an inferiority complex, but is complemented by very high levels of national pride (p. 600-601). The defeatism mostly stems from the many eras of subjugation that Poland had experienced. Previously, Russia was a weak nation mired with economic trouble. Now, Russia has re-emerged and thrust itself onto the world stage. Because of this, the inferiority complex takes its toll. Poland needs Russia to remain the bad guy for its national identity to remain relevant (p. 607). Embedded in Poland’s national identity is their self-proclaimed status of the ‘Defenders of Europe.’ The evidence is plainly laid out in history books. Poland turned back the Ottoman hordes at Vienna and miraculously defeated the Red Army at the battle of Warsaw in 1920, in addition to their countless acts of heroism against the Third Reich (p. 611). In the continuing issue of Ukraine, Józef Piłsudski, the dictator of Poland during the Russian Civil War, chose to ally himself with the Ukrainians over the White Russians. He, like most Poles, saw very little difference between the communists and the Tsarist forces. This, itself, brings an excellent point. Poland suffered extensively under the rule of the Soviets, as their national identity was threatened (p. 614). One should, however, ask the question of whether or not the Soviet Union is the same as Russia. Russia obviously values their standing with Poland whereas the Soviet Union had no time to care beyond the practical applications of one of its subjects dissenting. The answer has to be no. In addition, it should be addressed that the Poles earned their own image by fighting the Soviet Union, the Nazis, and the Ottoman Empire in addition to the Russian Empire. The clear solution to renovating this part of the Polish national identity is to point out what the Poles were fighting for rather than against. Those things were honor and freedom. Józef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, demonstrated this about the Poles as he gave his speech refusing to meet the demands of Nazi Germany: “We in Poland do not know the concept of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the lives of men, nations, and countries that is without price. That thing is honor “(Kuźniar, 19). Poland does not need Russia to be a perpetual enemy for its national identity to remain intact. Poland’s national identity should be reshaped to differentiate the Soviet Union from Russia and to shift the focus from who they were fighting to what they were fighting for.
To continue, Polish national identity is also very closely intertwined with the East-West paradigm. In short, Poland suffers from defeatism and an inferiority complex. Because of this paradigm, the Poles have a condescending view of Russia that offers a quick, easy fix to those problems (Zarycki p. 600). The view of Russia as a backward Asian nation offers some respite to Poland’s self-image problems. Poland considers itself a member of the West and of Europe (p. 604). The most inconvenient aspect of this view is that it involves shoving aside all similarities the Poland has with Russia. All that is Eastern about Poland’s identity must be abolished in order to “fit in” with the rest of Europe. Nothing could be more destructive for Poland’s relationship to the West, as the West already relies on Poland’s situation of being both inside and outside of the West. Poland is valuable in this sense because it has endured the harshness of Soviet subjugation (p. 615-16). Poland also has the eastern roots that make it relatable to countries like Russia and Turkey. Poland is able to understand Russia and it is relatable to the West because of a more closely shared religion, as Poland is predominately Roman Catholic (p. 617). This particular aspect of the Polish national identity needs to shift from seeing the East as undesirable to seeing it as valuable. Polish culture is unique because of its shared influences, so it makes sense for Poland to explore its own Eastern-ness and integrate it with its national identity. This way, Poland retains its unique usefulness to the West and it becomes more relatable to Russia in the process.
By consequence, the unique Polish position is exactly why rapprochement between Poland and Russia is necessary. Even in the days of the Soviet Union, Poland was referred to as a “Window to the West” (Cheremushkin, p. 13). Indeed, it is no secret that relations between Russia and the West have soured over the course of the Ukraine crisis. Vladimir Putin, himself, expresses his dissatisfaction with the course of events in recent years. He stresses that international cooperation toward maintaining the agreements made during the Minsk talks is vitally important (C. Rose & V. Putin, 2015). He shows his reservations toward Ukraine’s contribution while saying that Ukraine has behaved unilaterally, and he also believes that the agreements have not been implemented. In addition, Putin sees the sanctions that target Russia as aggressive measures that contradict international law. Such views indicate that the ongoing resolution of the crisis is at a standstill. Poland, however, is on good terms with the Ukrainians (Interfax Russia and CIS Bulletin). Poland and Russia working together to resolve the crisis could have potentially miraculous results. Such an outcome would drastically lower tensions throughout the region. Another opportunity for Polish-Russian cooperation exists in Syria. Poland’s own president, Andrzej Duda, addressed Islamic terrorism and the need for international cooperation to combat it (A. Duda, 2015). Russia has already made impressive progress on that front, to the delight of Poland’s previous foreign minister. This being said, if Poland’s voice in the West spoke for cooperation with Russia rather than spewing anti-Russian rhetoric, the myth of the ‘bridge to Europe’ could be proven true. Poland has a population of 38 Million people, making it the sixth most populated nation in Europe (S. Hix & B. Høyland, 2011, p. 65). As such, it holds 27 European Union council votes whereas the most populated nation, Germany, holds 29. Poland has enough voting power to make a difference. More than that, Poland’s voice matters especially to Europe, as Poland is known for its sensitivity to Russian influence in Eastern Europe. This powerful voice is key to Russia’s rapprochement with the West.
There exists today an incredible opportunity. The window is rapidly closing as the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Truth and Justice) party has won an absolute majority in the Polish Sejm. This party has won on the same anti-Russian rhetoric that has been coming from Poland for ten years. There is an opportunity for Poland and Russia to finally set their differences aside in a move that could bridge East to West in a way that could hardly have seemed possible in 1990. The ongoing conflicts, while terrible in their own rights, provide great opportunities for enemies to become friends. In this way, Ukraine can be used as a means for Russia and Poland to work together to solve a problem. The issues, of course, are bigger than that. A decade and a half of Russian efforts have fallen on mostly deaf ears. Every time that a thaw appears to be on the horizon, reality comes crashing into the picture as national interests diverge. Russia has, quite generously, done half of the work necessary to make this opportunity possible. They have renounced previously accepted truths, acknowledged that they were wrong, and attempted to accommodate their neighbor in their own historical narrative. They have done this in spite of unfavorable attitudes toward Poland that have dominated Russian discourse. Poland continued to express gratitude, but never any more than that. The time has come for Poland to complete the other half of the work necessary to bring this vision of rapprochement to life. Poland has acted as an inhibitor. Their people and governments have made their opinions clear on multiple occasions. They have legitimate grievances. None of these factors stopped Russia. The benefits of this newfound cooperation could be substantial. Quite frankly, its effect would be drastic, to say the least. A Polish-led Russian-West rapprochement would be the best possible scenario for the United States, for example. The US needs Russian cooperation to remove equipment from Afghanistan, broker deals with Iran, and to stabilize the Middle East in general. If these feats can be accomplished with only a single nation’s cooperation with Russia, one can only imagine what potential there can be for others. This opportunity, in essence, has the potential to calm tensions throughout the world, and to make everyone safer in the end.
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